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Abstract. We study the sources of the Great Moderation by estimating a variety
of medium-scale DSGE models that incorporate regime switches in shock variances
and in the inﬂation target. The best-ﬁt model, the one with two regimes in shock
variances, gives quantitatively diﬀerent dynamics in comparison with the benchmark
constant-parameter model. Our estimates show that three kinds of shocks accounted
for most of the Great Moderation and business-cycle ﬂuctuations: capital depreci-
ation shocks, neutral technology shocks, and wage markup shocks. In contrast to
the existing literature, we ﬁnd that changes in the inﬂation target or shocks in the
investment-speciﬁc technology played little role in macroeconomic volatility. More-
over, our estimates indicate much less nominal rigidities than those suggested in the
literature.
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I. Introduction
We reexamine, in this paper, the sources of the Great Moderation by estimating a
large set of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, along the lines
of Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004), Smets and Wouters (2007), and
Justiniano and Primiceri (2006).
1 We use modern Bayesian techniques to study a
constant-parameter model commonly used in the literature, a model that allows shock
variances to switch regimes according to a Markov-switching process, a model that
allows the inﬂation target to switch regimes over time, models that allow both the
inﬂation target and the shock variances to change regimes in a number of diﬀerent
ways, and models with diﬀerent assumptions about shock processes. Our methodology
allows us to incorporate diﬀerent DSGE models in a uniﬁed framework to systematically
examine the sources of the Great Moderation.
We study changes in the inﬂation target instead of changes in monetary policy’s
response to inﬂation mainly for computational reasons. When agents take into account
changes in monetary policy’s response to inﬂation in forming their expectations, a
solution method to the model is nonstandard (Liu, Waggoner, and Zha, 2009) and it
becomes computationally infeasible to estimate a large set of DSGE models like ours as
the solution requires an iterative algorithm that can be time-consuming in Monte Carlo
simulations.
2 Following Schorfheide (2005) and Ireland (2005), we examine instead
changes in the inﬂation target; in this case, the standard method of solving linear
rational expectations models can be directly used in our regime-switching framework,
as will be shown in Section V.
Our study sheds new light on the sources of the Great Moderation. First, we ﬁnd
strong empirical evidence in favor of the DSGE model with two regimes in shock
variances and with synchronized regime shifts in the variances. The model with inde-
pendent regime shifts in shock variances does not ﬁt to the data as well. Second, wage
markup shocks, depreciation shocks, and neutral technology shocks are most impor-
tant in accounting for the volatilities of output, inﬂation, and other macroeconomic
variables in both regimes. Third, there is little empirical evidence in favor of regime
changes in the inﬂation target. This conclusion is robust to a variety of model speciﬁca-
tions and diﬀerent assumptions about the shock persistence and consistent with other
1Works by Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2006) and Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and
Wouters (2007) also oﬀer useful references to large DSGE modeling.
2Previous DSGE studies have split the sample into two sub-samples (the pre-Volcker and post-
Volcker periods) to address monetary policy changes of this type (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000;
Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006).SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 3
works’ conclusions about changes in monetary policy in general (Stock and Watson,
2003; Canova and Gambetti, 2004; Cogley and Sargent, 2005; Primiceri, 2005; Sims
and Zha, 2006). Fourth, our posterior estimates imply more frequent re-optimizations
in price setting and nominal wage setting decisions than those obtained in other studies
(Smets and Wouters, 2007). The marginal posterior distributions assign little probabil-
ity to the Calvo price stickiness parameter above 0:6 and the wage stickiness parameter
above 0:4, implying a large probability that price and wage contracts last no more than
2 quarters on average.3
Neutral technology shocks play a much more important role in driving business
cycle ﬂuctuations than do investment-speciﬁc technology shocks, a result similar to
that found in Arias, Hansen, and Ohanian (2006). Wage markup shocks, along with
the distortions associated with wage and price stickiness, captures the wedge between
the intra-temporal marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and the marginal product of
labor, which, as argued by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), plays an important
role in accounting for the business cycle ﬂuctuations. The depreciation shock, on the
other hand, acts as a wedge in the intertemporal capital accumulation decision, which
is also an important source of the business cycle ﬂuctuations. Time variation in the
depreciation rate reﬂects the diﬀerence between economic depreciation and physical
depreciation.
The investment-speciﬁc technology shock also enters the intertemporal capital ac-
cumulation decisions. We ﬁnd, however, that this biased technology shock does not
account for much of the business-cycle ﬂuctuations. This result is diﬀerent from what
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2008) ﬁnd mainly because we use direct obser-
vations on the biased technology shock in our estimation while they do not.
II. Related literature
Our approach diﬀers from that employed in the literature in several aspects. First,
we aim at fully characterizing the uncertainty across diﬀerent models by examining
several diﬀerent versions of the DSGE model to check our results and substantiate our
conclusion. Although estimating a large set of models has not been performed in the
literature and pushes the limits of what our computational and analytical capacity
can handle, it is necessary to examine the robustness of a conclusion like ours about
potential sources of the Great Moderation.
3There often exist local posterior peaks at which the values of stickiness parameters are much
higher, but these peaks are much lower than the posterior mode (see Section VII.3 for a concrete
example).SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 4
Second, our approach does not require splitting the sample to examine changes in
monetary policy, although it nests sampling-splitting as a special case.
Third and methodologically, for fairly large DSGE models, especially for regime-
switching DSGE models, the posterior distribution tends to be very non-Gaussian,
making it very challenging to search for the global peak. We improve on earlier works
such as Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) by obtaining
our estimates at the posterior mode for each model that we study. We show that
economic implications can be seriously distorted if the estimates are based on a lower
posterior peak.4
Fourth, the DSGE models that we study are larger than those used by Schorfheide
(2005) and Ireland (2005). Studying a medium-scale DSGE model like ours is necessary
to avoid potential mis-speciﬁcations. Finally, we use three new methods for computing
marginal data densities in model comparison. Since these methods were developed from
completely diﬀerent concepts, it is essential that all these methods give a numerically
similar result so that the estimate of a marginal data density is unbiased and accurate
(Sims, Waggoner, and Zha, 2008).
There is also a large strand of literature that emphasizes changes in the inﬂation
target as a representation of important shifts in the conduct of U.S. monetary policy
(for example, Favero and Rovelli (2003); Erceg and Levin (2003)). Unlike earlier works,
we study a variety of fairly large DSGE models to determine whether the Federal
Reserve’s inﬂation target in the post-war period has changed.
As implied by Schorfheide (2005), with the inﬂation target switching regimes, the
model is likely to rely less on shock volatilities to generate the 1970s observations
of the dynamics of inﬂation, output, and other macroeconomic variables.5 Unlike
Sims and Zha (2006) where the number of VAR parameters is relatively large and the
inﬂation target is implicit, our way of modeling policy changes takes the inﬂation target
explicitly and gives a tightly parameterized model that has the best potential to ﬁnd
the importance of policy changes, if it exists, in generating business-cycle ﬂuctuations.
III. The Model
The model economy is populated by a continuum of households, each endowed with
a unit of diﬀerentiated labor skill indexed by i 2 [0;1]; and a continuum of ﬁrms, each
4The importance of ﬁnding the posterior mode for Bayesian estimation is discussed in Sims, Wag-
goner, and Zha (2008).
5Econometrically, Choi (2002) and Beyer and Farmer (2005) argue that allowing regime shifts can
potentially aid identiﬁcation of other parameters in the model.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 5
producing a diﬀerentiated good indexed by j 2 [0;1]. The monetary authority follows
a feedback interest rate rule, under which the nominal interest rate is set to respond to
its own lag and deviations of inﬂation and output from their targets. The policy regime
st represented by the time-varying inﬂation target switches between a ﬁnite number of
regimes contained in the set S, with the Markov transition probabilities summarized
by the matrix Q = [qij], where qij = Prob(st+1 = ijst = j) for i;j 2 S. The economy
is buﬀeted by several sources of shocks. The variance of each shock switches between
a ﬁnite number of regimes denoted by s¤
t 2 S¤ with the transition matrix Q¤ = [q¤
ij].
III.1. The aggregation sector. The aggregation sector produces a composite labor
skill denoted by Lt to be used in the production of each type of intermediate goods and a
composite ﬁnal good denoted by Yt to be consumed by each household. The production
of the composite skill requires a continuum of diﬀerentiated labor skills fLt(i)gi2[0;1]
as inputs, and the production of the composite ﬁnal good requires a continuum of

















where ¹wt and ¹pt determine the elasticity of substitution between the skills and be-
tween the goods, respectively. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we assume that
ln¹wt = (1 ¡ ½w)ln¹w + ½w ln¹w;t¡1 + ¾wt"wt ¡ Áw¾w;t¡1"w;t¡1 (2)
and that
ln¹pt = (1 ¡ ½p)ln¹p + ½p ln¹p;t¡1 + ¾pt"pt ¡ Áp¾p;t¡1"p;t¡1; (3)
where, for j 2 fw;pg, ½j 2 (¡1;1) is the AR(1) coeﬃcient, Áj is the MA(1) coeﬃcient,
¾jt ´ ¾j(s¤
t) is the regime-switching standard deviation, and "jt is an i.i.d. white noise
process with a zero mean and a unit variance. We interpret ¹wt and ¹pt as the wage
markup and price markup shocks.
The representative ﬁrm in the aggregation sector faces perfectly competitive markets
for the composite skill and the composite good. The demand functions for labor skill





















where the wage rate ¹ Wt of the composite skill is related to the wage rates fWt(i)gi2[0;1]
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III.2. The intermediate good sector. The production of a type j good requires










t (j) and L
f
t(j) are the inputs of capital and the composite skill and the variable
Zt denotes a neutral technology shock, which follows the stochastic process
Zt = ¸
t
zzt; lnzt = (1 ¡ ½z)lnz + ½z lnzt¡1 + ¾zt"zt; (6)
where ½z 2 (¡1;1) measures the persistence, ¾zt ´ ¾z(s¤
t) denotes the regime-switching
standard deviation, and "zt is an i.i.d. white noise process with a zero mean and a
unit variance. The parameters ®1 and ®2 measure the cost shares the capital and
labor inputs. Following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), we introduce some real
rigidity by assuming the existence of some ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors (such as land), so that
®1 + ®2 · 1.
Each ﬁrm in the intermediate-good sector is a price-taker in the input market and
a monopolistic competitor in the product market where it sets a price for its product,
taking the demand schedule in (4) as given. We follow Calvo (1983) and assume that
pricing decisions are staggered across ﬁrms. The probability that a ﬁrm cannot adjust
its price is given by »p. Following Woodford (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005), and Smets and Wouters (2007), we allow a fraction of ﬁrms that cannot
re-optimize their pricing decisions to index their prices to the overall price inﬂation
realized in the past period. Speciﬁcally, if the ﬁrm j cannot set a new price, its price





where ¼t = ¹ Pt= ¹ Pt¡1 is the inﬂation rate between t ¡ 1 and t, ¼ is the steady-state
inﬂation rate, and °p measures the degree of indexation.
A ﬁrm that can renew its price contract chooses Pt(j) to maximize its expected










t+i(j) ¡ Vt+i(j)]; (8)
where Dt;t+i is the period-t present value of a dollar in a future state in period t + i,
Vt+i(j) is the cost function, and the term Â
p
t;t+i comes from the price-updating rule (7)SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 7








t+k¡1¼1¡°p if i ¸ 1
1 if i = 0:
(9)










Yt+i. The ﬁrst order condition for the proﬁt-maximizing problem

















where ©t+i(j) = @Vt+i(j)=@Y d
t+i(j) denotes the marginal cost function. In the absence
of markup shocks, ¹pt would be a constant and (10) implies that the optimal price is
a markup over an average of the marginal costs for the periods in which the price will
remain eﬀective. Clearly, if »p = 0 for all t, that is, if prices are perfectly ﬂexible, then
the optimal price would be a markup over the contemporaneous marginal cost.
Cost-minimizing implies that the marginal cost function is given by
©t(j) =
·














2 and rkt denotes the real rental rate of capital input. The condi-












; 8j 2 [0;1]: (12)
III.3. Households. There is a continuum of households, each endowed with a diﬀeren-
tiated labor skill indexed by h 2 [0;1]. Household h derives utility from consumption
and leisure. We assume that there exists ﬁnancial instruments that provide perfect
insurance for the households in diﬀerent wage-setting cohorts, so that the households
make identical consumption and investment decisions despite that their wage incomes
may diﬀer due to staggered wage setting.6 In what follows, we impose this assumption
and omit the household index for consumption and investment.
6To obtain complete risk-sharing among households in diﬀerent wage-setting cohorts does not rely
on the existence of such (implicit) ﬁnancial arrangements. As shown by Huang, Liu, and Phaneuf
(2004), the same equilibrium dynamics can be obtained in a model with a representative household
(and thus complete insurance) consisting of a large number of worker members. The workers supply
their homogenous labor skill to a large number of employment agencies, who transform the homogenous
skill into diﬀerentiated skills and set nominal wages in a staggered fashion.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 8














where ¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, Ct denotes consumption, Lt(h) denotes
hours worked, ´ > 0 is the inverse Frish elasticity of labor hours, and b measures the
importance of habit formation. The variable At denotes a preference shock, which
follows the stationary process
lnAt = (1 ¡ ½a)lnA + ½a lnAt¡1 + ¾at"at; (14)
where ½a 2 (¡1;1) is the persistence parameter, ¾at ´ ¾a(s¤
t) is the regime-switching
standard deviation, and "at is an i.i.d. white noise process with a zero mean and a unit
variance.




[It + a(ut)Kt¡1] + EtDt;t+1Bt+1 ·
Wt(h)L
d
t(h) + ¹ PtrktutKt¡1 + ¦t + Bt + Tt: (15)
In the budget constraint, It denotes investment, Bt+1 is a nominal state-contingent
bond that represents a claim to one dollar in a particular event in period t + 1, and
this claim costs Dt;t+1 dollars in period t; Wt(h) is the nominal wage for h’s labor skill,
Kt¡1 is the beginning-of-period capital stock, ut is the utilization rate of capital, ¦t
is the proﬁt share, and Tt is a lump-sum transfer from the government. The function
a(ut) captures the cost of variable capital utilization. Following Altig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we
assume that a(u) is increasing and convex. The term Qt denotes the investment-
speciﬁc technological change. Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997),





where ¸q is the growth rate of the investment-speciﬁc technological change and qt is an
investment-speciﬁc technology shock, which follows a stationary process given by
lnqt = (1 ¡ ½q)lnq + ½q lnqt¡1 + ¾qt"qt; (17)
where ½q 2 (¡1;1) is the persistence parameter, ¾qt ´ ¾q(s¤
t) is the regime-switching
standard deviation, and "qt is an i.i.d. white noise process with a zero mean and a unitSOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 9
variance. The importance of investment-speciﬁc technological change is also docu-
mented in Fisher (2006) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (Forthcoming).
The capital stock evolves according to the law of motion
Kt = (1 ¡ ±t)Kt¡1 + [1 ¡ S(It=It¡1)]It; (18)
where the function S(¢) represents the adjustment cost in capital accumulation. We as-





is the steady-state growth rate of output and consumption. The term ±t denotes the
depreciation rate of the capital stock and follows the stationary stochastic process
ln±t = (1 ¡ ½d)ln± + ½d ln±t¡1 + ¾dt"dt; (19)
where ½e 2 (¡1;1) is the persistence parameter, ¾dt ´ ¾d(s¤
t) is the regime-switching
standard deviaiton, and "dt is the white noise innovation with a zero mean and a
unit variance. We introduce this time variation in the depreciation rate to capture
the diﬀerence between economic depreciation (reﬂecting in part an unobserved quality
improvement in equipment) and physical depreciation.
The household takes prices and all wages but its own as given and chooses Ct, It, Kt,
ut, Bt+1, and Wt(h) to maximize (13) subject to (15) - (18), the borrowing constraint
Bt+1 ¸ ¡B for some large positive number B, and the labor demand schedule Ld
t(h)
described in (4).
The wage-setting decisions are staggered across households. In each period, a fraction
»w of households cannot re-optimize their wage decisions and, among those who cannot
re-optimize, a fraction °w of them index their nominal wages to the price inﬂation
realized in the past period. In particular, if the household h cannot set a new nominal



















1¡®1 denoting the trend growth rate of aggre-
gate output (and the real wage). If a household h 2 [0;1] can re-optimize its nominal
wage-setting decision, it chooses W(h) to maximize the utility subject to the bud-














t;t+i] = 0; (21)SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 10
where MRSt(h) denotes the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and income
for household h and Âw









t;t+i if i ¸ 1







t . In the absence of wage-markup shocks, ¹wt would be a constant
and (21) implies that the optimal wage is a constant markup over a weighted average
of the marginal rate of substitution for the periods in which the nominal wage remains
eﬀective. If »w = 0, then the nominal wage adjustments are ﬂexible and (21) implies
that the nominal wage is a markup over the contemporaneous marginal rate of sub-
stitution. We derive the rest of the household’s optimizing conditions in a technical
appendix available upon request.
III.4. The government and monetary policy. The government follows a Ricardian
ﬁscal policy, with its spending ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes so that ¹ PtGt = Tt, where
Gt denotes the government spending in ﬁnal consumption units. Denote by ~ Gt ´ Gt
¸¤
t










We assume that ~ Gt follows the stationary stochastic process
ln ~ Gt = (1 ¡ ½g)ln ~ G + ½g ln ~ Gt¡1 + ¾gt"gt + ½gz¾zt"zt; (24)
where we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and assume that the government spending
shock responds to productivity shocks.
Monetary policy is described by a feedback interest rate rule that allows the possi-















where Rt = [EtDt;t+1]¡1 denotes the nominal interest rate and ¼¤(st) denotes the
regime-dependent inﬂation target. The constant terms ·, ½r, Á¼, and Áy are policy
parameters. The term "rt denotes the monetary policy shock, which follows an i.i.d.
normal process with a zero mean and a unit variance. The term ¾rt ´ ¾r(s¤
t) is the
regime-switching standard deviation of the monetary policy shock. We assume that
the 8 shocks "wt, "pt, "zt, "qt, "dt, "at, "rt, and "gt are mutually independent.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 11
III.5. Market clearing and equilibrium. In equilibrium, markets for bond, com-
posite labor, capital stock, and composite goods all clear. Bond market clearing implies




t(j)dj = Lt. Capital









[It + a(ut)Kt¡1] + Gt = Yt; (26)















®1+®2 dj measuring the price dispersion.
Given ﬁscal and monetary policy, an equilibrium in this economy consists of prices
and allocations such that (i) taking prices and all nominal wages but its own as given,
each household’s allocation and nominal wage solve its utility maximization problem;
(ii) taking wages and all prices but its own as given, each ﬁrm’s allocation and price
solve its proﬁt maximization problem; (iii) markets clear for bond, composite labor,
capital stock, and ﬁnal goods.
IV. Equilibrium Dynamics
IV.1. Stationary equilibrium and the deterministic steady state. We focus on
a stationary equilibrium with balanced growth. On a balanced growth path, output,
consumption, investment, capital stock, and the real wage all grow at constant rates,
while hours remain constant. Further, in the presence of investment-speciﬁc techno-
logical change, investment and capital grow at a faster rate. To induce stationarity, we























t is the underlying trend for output, consumption, and the real wage given by
(23).
Along the balanced growth path, as noted by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell
(1997), the real rental price of capital keeps falling since the capital-output ratio keeps
rising. The rate at which the rental price is falling is given by ¸q. Thus, the transformed
variable ~ rkt = rktQt, that is, the rental price in consumption unit, is stationary. Further,
the marginal utility of consumption is declining, so we deﬁne ~ Uct = Uct¸¤
t to induce
stationarity.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 12
The steady state in the model is the stationary equilibrium in which all shocks are
shut oﬀ, including the “regime shocks” to the inﬂation target. To derive the steady
state, we represent the ﬁnite Markov switching process with a vector AR(1) process












with 1fst = jg = 1 if st = j and 0 otherwise. As shown in Hamilton (1994), the
random vector est follows an AR(1) process:
est = Qest¡1 + vt; (30)
where Q is the transition matrix of the Markov switching process and the innovation
vector has the property that Et¡1vt = 0. In the steady state, vt = 0 so that (30)
deﬁnes the ergodic probabilities for the Markov process and, from (28), the steady-
state inﬂation ¼ is the ergodic mean of the inﬂation target. Given ¼, the derivations
for the rest of the steady-state equilibrium conditions are straightforward.
IV.2. Linearized equilibrium dynamics. To solve for the equilibrium dynamics,
we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady state. We
use a hatted variable ^ xt to denote the log-deviations of the stationary variable Xt from
its steady-state value (i.e., ^ xt = ln(Xt=X)).
Linearizing the optimal pricing decision rule implies that7
^ ¼t ¡ °p^ ¼t¡1 =
·p
1 + ¹ ®µp











[®1^ rkt + ®2 ^ wt] + ¹ ®^ yt: (32)
This is the standard price Phillips-curve relation generalized to allow for partial dy-
namic indexation. In the special case without indexation (i.e., °p = 0), this relation
reduces to the standard forward-looking Phillips curve relation, under which the price
inﬂation depends on the current-period real marginal cost and the expected future in-
ﬂation. In the presence of dynamic indexation, the price inﬂation also depends on its
own lag.
7Derivations of the linearized equilibrium conditions are available upon request.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 13
Linearizing the optimal wage-setting decision rule implies that
^ wt¡ ^ wt¡1+^ ¼t¡°w^ ¼t¡1 =
·w
1 + ´µw
(^ ¹wt+ ^ mrst¡ ^ wt)+¯Et[^ wt+1¡ ^ wt+^ ¼t+1¡°w^ ¼t]; (33)
where ^ wt denotes the log-deviations of the real wage, ^ mrst = ´^ lt ¡ ^ Uct denotes the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, µw ´
¹w
¹w¡1, and ·w ´
(1¡¯»w)(1¡»w)
»w is a constant. To help understand the economics of this equation, we
rewrite this relation in terms of the nominal wage inﬂation:
^ ¼
w
t ¡ °w^ ¼t¡1 =
·w
1 + ´µw
(^ ¹wt + ^ mrst ¡ ^ wt) + ¯Et(^ ¼
w




[®1(¢^ zt ¡ ¯Et¢^ zt+1) + ®2(¢^ qt ¡ ¯Et¢^ qt+1)]: (34)
where ^ ¼w
t = ^ wt ¡ ^ wt¡1 + ^ ¼t + ¢^ ¸¤
t denotes the nominal wage inﬂation. This nominal-
wage Phillips curve relation parallels that of the price-Phillips curve and has similar
interpretations.
The rest of the linearized equilibrium conditions are summarized below:









[®2(¢^ zt ¡ ¯Et¢^ zt+1) + ¢^ qt ¡ ¯Et¢^ qt+1]
¾
; (35)
^ qkt = Et
½
¢^ at+1 + ¢^ Uc;t+1 ¡
1
1 ¡ ®1





(1 ¡ ±)^ qk;t+1 ¡ ±^ ±t+1 + ~ rk^ rk;t+1
i¾
; (36)
^ rkt = ¾u^ ut; (37)
0 = Et
·
¢^ at+1 + ¢^ Uc;t+1 ¡
1
1 ¡ ®1






















^ yt = cy^ ct + iy^ it + uy^ ut + gy^ gt; (40)
^ yt = ®1
·
^ kt¡1 + ^ ut ¡
1
1 ¡ ®1
(®2¢^ zt + ¢^ qt)
¸
+ ®2^ lt; (41)
^ wt = ^ rkt + ^ kt¡1 + ^ ut ¡
1
1 ¡ ®1
(®2¢^ zt + ¢^ qt) ¡ ^ lt; (42)
where (35) is the linearized investment decision equation with ^ qkt denoting the shadow
value of existing capital (i.e., Tobin’s Q) and the ¢ denoting the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator
(so that ¢xt = xt ¡ xt¡1); (36) is the linearized capital Euler equation; (37) is the
linearized capacity utilization decision equation with ¾u ´
a00(1)
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the function a(u) evaluated at the steady state; (38) is the linearized bond Euler
equation; (39) is the linearized law of motion for the capital stock; (40) is the linearized
aggregate resource constraint, with the steady-state ratios given by cy =
~ C




~ rk ~ K
~ Y ¸I, and gy =
~ G
~ Y ; (41) is the linearized aggregate production function; and (42)
is the linearized factor demand relation.
Finally, the linearized interest rate rule is given by
^ Rt = ½r ^ Rt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½r)[Á¼(^ ¼t ¡ ^ ¼
¤(st)) + Áy^ yt] + ¾rt"rt; (43)
where the term ^ ¼¤(st) ´ log¼¤(st)¡log¼ denotes the deviations of the inﬂation target
from its ergodic mean.
V. Estimation Approach
We estimate the parameters in our model using the Bayesian method. We describe a
general empirical strategy so that the method can be applied to other regimes-switching
DSGE models. As shown in the appendices, our model contains twenty seven variables.
Adding the ﬁve lagged variables ^ yt¡1;^ ct¡1;^ it¡1, ^ wt¡1, and ^ qt¡1 to the list gives a total
of thirty three variables. We denote all these state variables by the vector ft where ft
is so arranged that the ﬁrst eight variables are ^ yt;^ ct;^ it; ^ wt; ^ qt; ^ ¼t; ^ `t, and ^ Rt and the last
ﬁve variables are ^ yt¡1;^ ct¡1;^ it¡1, ^ wt¡1, and ^ qt¡1.
We apply the relation (28) to the policy rule (43), where the vector est deﬁned in (29)
follows a vector AR(1) process described in (30). Expanding the log-linearized system
with the additional variables represented by est maintains the log-linear form in which
all coeﬃcients are constant (i.e., independent of regime changes). A standard solution
technique, such as the method proposed by Sims (2002), can be directly utilized to
solve our DSGE model. The solution leads to the following VAR(1) form of state
equations
ft = c(st;st¡1) + Fft¡1 + C(s
¤
t)²t; (44)
where ²t = [²rt; ²pt; ²wt; ²gt; ²zt; ²at; ²dt; ²qt]0, and c(st) is a vector function of the in-
ﬂation targets ¼¤(st) and ¼¤(st¡1) and the elements in the transition matrix Q, and
C(s¤










It follows from (44) that the solution to our DSGE model depends on the composite
regime (st;st¡1;s¤
t). If s¤
t is assumed to be the same as (st;st¡1) (see Schorfheide
(2005)), then the composite regime collapses to st. To simplify our notation and keepSOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 15
analytical expressions tractable, we use st to represent a composite regime that includes
(st;st¡1;s¤
t) as a special case for the rest of this section.
Our estimation is based on the 1959:I-2007:IV quarterly time-series observations on
8 U.S. aggregate variables: real per capita GDP (Y Data
t ), real per capita consumption
(CData
t ), real per capita investment (IData
t ), real wage (wData
t ), the investment-speciﬁc
technology (i.e., the biased technology Qt), the quarterly GDP-deﬂator inﬂation rate
(¼Data
t ), per capita hours (LData




t corresponds to It
Qt in the model (i.e., investment measured in units of
consumption goods); a detailed description of the data is in Appendix A. These data
















The observable vector is connected to the model (state) variables through the mea-
surement equations







Give the aforementioned regime-switching state space form, one can estimate the model
following the general estimation methodology of Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2008).8
V.1. Three methods for computing marginal data densities. To evaluate the
model’s ﬁt to the data and compare it to the ﬁt of other models, one wishes to compute
the marginal data density implied by the model. To keep the notation simple, let µ
represent a vector of all model parameters except the transition matrix and Q be a




p(YT j µ;Q)p(µ)dµdQ; (46)
where the likelihood function p(YT j µ;Q) can be evaluated recursively. For many
empirical models, the modiﬁed harmonic mean (MHM) method of Gelfand and Dey
(1994) is a widely used method to compute the marginal data density. The MHM







p(µ;Q j YT)dµdQ; (47)
8The method details are also provided in an independent technical appendix to this article, which
is available on http://home.earthlink.net/ tzha01/workingPapers/wp.html.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 16
where £ is the support of the posterior probability density and h(µ;Q), often called a





A numerical evaluation of the integral on the right hand side of (47) can be accom-










where (µ(i);Q(i)) is the ith draw of (µ;Q) from the posterior distribution p(µ;Q j YT).
If m(µ;Q) is bounded above, the rate of convergence from this MC approximation is
likely to be practical.
Geweke (1999) proposes a Gaussian function for h(¢) constructed from the posterior
simulator. The likelihood and posterior density functions for our medium-scale DSGE
model turn out to be quite non-Gaussian and there exist zeros of the posterior pdf in the
interior points of the parameter space. In this case, the standard MHM procedure tends
to be unreliable as the MCMC draws are likely to be dominated by a few draws as the
number of draws increase. Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2008) proposes a truncated non-
Gaussian weighting function for h(¢) to remedy the problem. This weighting function
seems to work well for the non-Gaussian posterior density.
In addition to the method of Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2008), we use the unpub-
lished method developed by Ulrich Müeller at Princeton University. To summarize
Müeller’s method for computing the marginal data density, we introduce the follow-
ing notation. Let µ be an n £ 1 vector of random variables, p(µ) be the target pdf,
whose probability density is of unknown form, and p¤(µ) be the target kernel where
p(µ) = c¤p¤(µ). Thus, our objective is to obtain an accurate estimate of the positive
constant c¤. Let h(µ) be an approximate or weighting pdf and c be a positive real



























One can show that this function has the following properties:
² f(c) is monotonically decreasing in c;
² f(0) = 1 and f(1) = ¡1.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 17
Given these properties, one can use a bisection method to ﬁnd an estimate of c¤ where
f(c¤) = 0.
A third method we use is bridge sampling of Meng and Wong (1996). The bridge-
sampling method has been often regarded as one of the most reliable methods for
computing the Bayes factor. Since these three methods are developed from diﬀerent
mathematical relationships, we recommend using all these methods to ensure that the
estimated value of the marginal data density is numerically similar across methods.
Because the posterior density function is very non-Gaussian and complicated in
shape, it is all the more important to ﬁnd the posterior mode via an optimization
routine. The estimate of the mode not only represents the most likely value (and
thus the posterior estimate) but also serves as a crucial starting point for initializing
diﬀerent chains of MCMC draws.
For various DSGE models studied in this paper, ﬁnding the mode has proven to
be a computationally challenging task. The optimization method we use combines
the block-wise BFGS algorithm developed by Sims, Waggoner, and Zha (2008) and
various constrained optimization routines contained in the commercial IMSL package.
The block-wise BFGS algorithm, following the idea of Gibbs sampling and EM algo-
rithm, breaks the set of model parameters into subsets and uses Christopher A. Sims’s
csminwel program to maximize the likelihood of one set of the model’s parameters
conditional on the other sets.9 Maximization is iterated at each subset until it con-
verges. Then the optimization iterates between the block-wise BFGS algorithm and
the IMSL routines until it converges. The convergence criterion is the square root of
machine epsilon.
Thus far we have described the optimization process for only one starting point.10
Our experience is that without such a thorough search, one can be easily misled to a
much lower posterior value (e.g., a few hundreds lower in log value than the posterior
peak). We thus use a set of cluster computing tools described in Ramachandran,
Urazov, Waggoner, and Zha (2007) to search for the posterior mode. We begin with a
grid of 100 starting points; after convergence, we perturb each maximum point in both
small and large steps to generate additional 20 new starting points and restart the
optimization process again; the posterior estimates attain the highest posterior density
9The csminwel program can be found on http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/optimize/.
10For the no-switching (constant-parameter) DSGE model, it takes a couple of hours to ﬁnd the
posterior peak. While the model with two-regime shock variances takes about 20 hours to converge,
the model with two-regime inﬂation targets and two-regime two-regime shock variances takes four
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value. The other converged points typically have much lower likelihood values by at
least a magnitude of hundreds of log values. For each DSGE model, the peak value of
the posterior kernel and the mode estimates are reported.
V.2. Priors. We set three parameters a priori. We set the steady-state government
spending to output ratio at gy = 0:18. We follow Justiniano and Primiceri (2006)
and ﬁx the persistence of the government spending shock process at ½g = 0:99. As
noted by Smets and Wouters (2007), all these government parameter are diﬃcult to
estimate unless government spending is included in the set of measurement equations.
Finally, we normalize and ﬁx the steady-state hours worked at L = 0:2. We estimate
all the remaining parameters. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the prior distributions for the
structural parameters and the shock parameters.
Our priors are chosen to be more ﬂexible and less tight than those in the previous
literature. Speciﬁcally, instead of specifying the mean and the standard deviation, we
use the 90% probability interval to back out the hyperparameter values of the prior
distribution.11 The intervals are generally set wide enough to allow the possibility of
multiple posterior peaks (Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2008). Our approach is also nec-
essary to deal with skewed distributions and allow for some reasonable hyperparameter
values in certain distributions (such as the Inverse-Gamma) where the ﬁrst two mo-
ments may not exist. The probability intervals reported in Table 3 cover the calibrated
value of each parameter.
We begin with the preference parameters b, ´, and ¯. Our prior for the habit-
persistence parameter b follows the Beta distribution. We choose the 2 hyper-parameters
of the Beta distribution such that the lower bound for b (0:05) has a cumulative prob-
ability of 5% and the upper bound (0:948) has a cumulative probability of 95%. This
90% probability interval for b covers the values used by most economists (for exam-
ple, Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005)). Our prior for the inverse Frisch elasticity ´ follows the Gamma distribution.
We choose the 2 hyper-parameters of the Gamma distribution such that the lower
bound (0:2) and the upper bound (10:0) of ´ correspond to the 90% probability in-
terval. This prior range for ´ implies that the Frisch elasticity lies between 0:1 and
5, a range broad enough to cover the values based on both microeconomic evidence
(Pencavel, 1986) and macroeconomic studies (Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright, 2000).
Our prior for the transformed subjective discount factor Â¯ ´ 100( 1
¯ ¡ 1) follows the
11The program for backing out the hyperparameter values of a given prior can be found in
http://home.earthlink.net/ tzha02/ProgramCode/programCode.html.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 19
Gamma distribution, with the hyper-parameters appropriately chosen such that the
bounds for the 90% probability interval of Â¯ are 0:2 and 4:0. The implied value of ¯
lies in the range between 0:9615 and 0:998, which nests the values obtained by Smets
and Wouters (2007) (¯ = 0:9975) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004)
(¯ = 0:9926).
Next, we discuss the prior distributions for the technology parameters ®1, ®2, ¸q, ¸¤,
¾u, S00, and ±. Our priors for the labor share and capital share both follow the Beta
distribution with the restriction ®1+®2 · 1 so that the production technology requires
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2000). Speciﬁcally, the bounds for
the ®1 values in the 90% probability interval are 0:15 and 0:35 and those for ®2 are
0:35 and 0:75. With the restriction ®1 + ®2 · 1, however, the joint 90% probability
region would be somewhat diﬀerent. We assume that the priors for the (transformed)
trend growth rates of the investment-speciﬁc technology and the neutral technology
both follow the Gamma distribution, with the 5% and 95% bounds given by 0:1 and
1:5 respectively. These values imply that, with 90% probability, the prior values for the
trend growth rates ¸q and ¸¤ lie in the range between 1:001 and 1:015 (corresponding
to annual rates of 0:4% and 6%, respectively). We assume that the priors for the
capacity utilization parameter ¾u and the investment adjustment cost parameter S00
both follow the Gamma distribution, with the lower bounds given by 0:5 and 0:1 and
the upper bounds given by 3:0 and 5:0, respectively. These 90% probability ranges
cover the values obtained, for example, by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007). We assume that the prior for the average annualized
depreciation rate follows the Beta distribution with the 90% probability range lying
between 0:05 and 0:20.
Third, we discuss the prior distributions for the parameters that characterize price
and nominal wage setting in the model. These include the average price markup ¹p,
the average wage markup ¹w, the Calvo probabilities of non-adjustment in pricing »p
and in wage-setting »w, and the indexation parameters °p and °w. The priors for the
net markups ¹p ¡ 1 and ¹w ¡ 1 both follow the Gamma distribution with the 90%
probability range covering the values between 0:01 and 0:5. This range covers most of
the calibrated values of the markup parameters used in the literature (e.g., Basu and
Fernald (2002), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Huang and Liu (2002)). The priors
for the price and wage duration parameters »p and »w both follow the Beta distribution
with the 90% probability range between 0:1 and 0:75. Under this prior distribution,
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quarters. This range covers the values of the frequencies of price and wage adjustments
used in the literature (e.g., Bils and Klenow (2004), Taylor (1999)). The priors for the
indexation parameters °p and °w both follow the uniform distribution with the 90%
probability range lying between 0:05 and 0:95. In this sense, we have loose priors on
these indexation parameters, the range of which covers those used in most studies (e.g.,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), and Woodford
(2003)).
Finally, we discuss the coeﬃcients in the monetary policy rule, including ½r, Á¼, and
Áy. The prior for the interest-rate smoothing parameter ½r follows the Beta distribution
with the 90% probability range between 0:05 and 0:948. The prior for the inﬂation
coeﬃcient Á¼ follows the Gamma distribution with the 90% probability range between
0:5 and 5:0. The prior for the output coeﬃcient Áy follows the Gamma distribution
with the 90% probability range between 0:05 and 3:0. This range includes the values
obtained by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) and others. These prior values allow
for an indeterminacy region. When the equilibrium is indeterminate, we follow Boivin
and Giannoni (2006) and use the MSV solution. In our estimation, however, there is
practically little probability for the parameters to be in the indeterminate region.
Our priors for the AR(1) coeﬃcients for the neutral and biased technology shocks
½q and ½z are uniformly distributed in the [0;1] interval. The AR(1) coeﬃcients for all
other shocks and the MA(1) coeﬃcients for the price and wage markup shocks follow
the Beta distribution with the 5%-95% probability range given by [0:05;0:948]. The
prior for the parameter ½gz follows the Gamma distribution with the 90% probability
range given by [0:2;3:0]. The standard deviations of each of the 8 shocks follow the
Inverse Gamma distribution with the 90% probability range given by [0:0005;1:0]. This
probability range implies a more agnostic prior than Smets and Wouters (2007) and
Justiniano and Primiceri (2006). Such an agnostic prior is needed to allow for possible
large changes in shock variances across regimes, as found in Sims and Zha (2006).
We have experimented with diﬀerent priors. In one alternative prior, we follow the
literature and make a prior on the persistence parameters in shock processes much
tighter towards zero, such as the Beta(1;2) probability density. Our conclusions hold
true for these priors as well.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 21
VI. Model Fit
The ﬁrst set of results to discuss is measures of model ﬁt, with the comparison based
on maximum log posterior densities adjusted by the Schwarz criterion.12 Table 1 reports
Schwarz criteria for diﬀerent versions of our DSGE model (the column “Baseline”) and
for models with the restriction that all the persistence parameters in both price markup
and wage markup processes are set to zero (the column “Restricted”).
Table 1 shows that the model with regime shifts in shock variances only (DSGE-2v)
is the best-ﬁt model, much better than the constant-parameter DSGE model (DSGE-
con). The Schwarz criterion for the baseline DSGE-2v model is 5963:03, compared
to 5859:71 for the DSGE-con model. When we allow the inﬂation target to switch
regimes while holding the shock variances constant (DSGE-2c), the model’s ﬁt does
not improve upon the constant-parameter DSGE model. When we allow both the
inﬂation target and shock variances to switch regimes with the same Markov process
(i.e., regime switching is synchronized), the model (DSGE-2cv) does better than the
one with regime switching in the inﬂation target alone, but it does not improve upon
the baseline DSGE-2v model with regime shifts in the shock variances only. When
we relax the assumption that switches in the shock regime and those in the inﬂation
target regime are synchronized and compute the Schwarz criterion for the model with
the target regime and the shock regime independent of each other (DSGE-2c2v), we
ﬁnd that the model’s ﬁt does not improve relative to either the DSGE-2cv model with
synchronized regime shifts in the inﬂation target and the shock variances or the baseline
DSGE-2v model with synchronized regime shifts in shock variances only. We have also
examined the possibility of 3 shock regimes instead of 2. We ﬁnd that the 3-regime
model (DSGE-3v) does not improve upon the baseline 2-regime model (DSGE-2v).
We have also estimated models with shock variances following independent Markov
switching processes. This scenario approximates the stochastic volatility model of
Uhlig (1997), where each shock variance has its own independent stochastic process
(Tauchen, 1986; Sims, Waggoner, and Zha, 2008). In addition, we have grouped a
subset of shock variances having the same Markov processes. None of these models
ﬁts to the data better than our baseline DSGE-2v model. For example, when we allow
regimes associated with the variances of the two technology shocks to be independent
of the regime switching processes of the other shock variances (DSGE-2v2v), we obtain
a Schwarz criterion of 5958:18, which is lower than that of the baseline DSGE-2v model
12The Schwarz criterion is similar to the Laplace approximation used by Smets and Wouters (2007).SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 22
(5963:03). In short, the data favor the parsimoniously-parameterized model with shock
variances switch regimes simultaneously.
The last column in Table 1 shows that the model with regime changes in shock vari-
ances only continues to dominate all the other models, when the persistence parameters
in both price and wage markup shock processes are restricted to zero. In particular,
the model with the target switching regimes (DSGE-2c) does not improve upon the
constant-parameter model. Of course, all these restricted models ﬁt to the data much
worse than the corresponding baseline models, implying that persistent shock processes
are important in ﬁtting the data.
Finally, we have estimated a number of models with persistence parameters in other
shock processes set to zero and with habit and indexation parameters set to zero.
The model with synchronized regimes in shock variances continue to outperform other
models in ﬁtting the data.
The relative performance of the alternative DSGE models in ﬁtting the data does not
change when we look at the marginal data density (MDD). Table 2 reports the MDD
for each of the alternative models. The table shows that the model with simultaneous
regime shifts in shock variances (DSGE-2v) is the best-ﬁt model not only in terms
of the Schwarz criterion, but also in terms of the marginal data density. In particu-
lar, the DSGE-2v model’s MDD is 5832:38, much higher than that of the DSGE-con
model (whose MDD is 5741:24). The model with regime switching in the inﬂation
target alone (DSGE-2c) slightly outperforms the constant parameter model, but sub-
stantially under-performs the DSGE-2v model. With regime shifts in shock variances,
introducing regime shifts in the inﬂation target synchronized with regime shifts in
shock variances (DSGE-2cv) or allowing the inﬂation target to follow a Markov switch-
ing process independent of shock regimes (DSGE-2c2v) does not improve the marginal
data density relative to the DSGE-2v model.13
VII. Estimates of Structural Parameters
Because the constant-parameter model is a most often used model, we report the
parameter estimates for the baseline DSGE-con model. We then compare them with
the results in the existing literature and with the estimates for our best-ﬁt model (i.e.,
the baseline DSGE-2v model). We also discuss the implications based on the estimates
at a local (lower) posterior peak to show how the results can be seriously distorted.
13The good ﬁt represented by DSGE-2cv comes entirely from signiﬁcant shifts in shock variances.
The estimated inﬂation targets are 2:18% for one regime and 1:70% for the other regime and the
diﬀerence between these two targets are statistically insigniﬁcant.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 23
The results are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The last column labelled by “DSGE-con-lp”
reports the results obtained at a local posterior peak for the constant-parameter DSGE
model.
VII.1. The constant-parameter model. We ﬁrst discuss the posterior estimates for
the model with no regime shifts. This model is similar to that in Smets and Wouters
(2007), with ﬁve notable exceptions. First, we introduce a source of real rigidity in
the form of ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, which replaces the kinked demand curves considered
by Smets and Wouters (2007). Second, we introduce trend growth in the investment-
speciﬁc technological change to better capture the data, in which the relative price of
investment goods (e.g., equipment and software) has been declining for most of the
postwar period, while in Smets and Wouters (2007) the investment-speciﬁc techno-
logical changes have no trend component. We use the observed time series of biased
technological changes in our estimation, while Smets and Wouters (2007) treat these
changes as a latent variable. Third, we introduce the depreciation shock that acts as
a wedge in the capital-accumulation Euler equation. Fourth, the preference shock in
our model enters all intertemporal decisions, including choices of the nominal bond,
the capital stock, and investment, while Smets and Wouters (2007) introduce a “risk-
premium shock” that enters the bond Euler equation only and does not aﬀect other
intertemporal decisions. Finally, in the interest rate rule, we assume that the nominal
interest rate responds to deviations of inﬂation from its target and detrended out-
put, while in Smets and Wouters (2007) the interest rate rule targets inﬂation, output
gap, and the growth rate of output gap. These distinctions may explain some of the
diﬀerences between our estimated results and theirs.
We report the posterior estimates for our constant-parameter model (DSGE-con)
in the ﬁfth column (under “DSGE-con”) of Table 3. The data are informative about
many structural parameters, as will be discussed in Section VIII.3. The table shows
that among the three preference parameters, the posterior mode for habit persistence
is 0:88, which lies in the higher end of the 90% probability interval. The posterior
mode for ´ is 2:24, implying a Frisch elasticity of about 0:45, consistent with most
microeconomic studies. The estimate for the subjective discount factor implies that ¯
is about 0:9989, which is similar to the value obtained by Smets and Wouters (2007)
(0:9984).
Among the technology parameters, the posterior mode for ®1 (0:154) is close to the
lower bound of the 90% probability interval for the prior distribution and is lower
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constraint ®1+®2 · 1, the posterior mode for ®2 (0:837) lies inside the joint 90% prior
probability region. These posterior estimates suggest that the data prefer a model
speciﬁcation with (near) constant-returns production technology. The estimated trend
growth rate for the investment-speciﬁc technological change is about 4% per annum,
which is slightly higher than the calibrated value obtained by Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Krusell (1997). The estimate for the trend growth rate of the neutral technological
change is about 0:72% per annum. The curvature parameter in the utilization function
(¾u) is estimated at 2:266, which lies at the high end of the 90% prior probability
range. This value is close to that estimated by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Linde (2004) (2:02), although it is higher than that obtained by Smets and Wouters
(2007) (1:174) and lower than that obtained by Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) (7:13).
The investment adjustment cost parameter (S00) has a posterior mode of 1:525. This
value is somewhat lower than those obtained in the literature. Unlike most studies
in the literature that ﬁx the value of the capital depreciation rate a priori, we allow
the depreciation rate to follow a stationary stochastic process and we estimate the
parameters in the process. The posterior estimate implies that the average annum
depreciation rate is about 10:7%, which is remarkably close to the standard calibration
value in the real business cycle literature.
Among the pricing and wage setting parameters, our posterior estimates show that
the average price markup is about 1:002, which is consistent with the studies by Hall
(1988), Basu and Fernald (1997), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), who argue
that the pure economic proﬁt is close to zero. It is also similar to the estimate ob-
tained by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004), but much smaller than
the value estimated by Justiniano and Primiceri (2006). Our estimate for the aver-
age wage markup is 1:07, which is lower than the calibrated value (Huang and Liu,
2002) and the estimated value (Justiniano and Primiceri, 2006) in the literature, but
is similar to the value used by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The pos-
terior estimates imply that the price contracts last on average for slightly more than
2 quarters and nominal wage contracts are very short (slightly more than 1 quarter).
These estimated durations for the nominal contracts are very close to those obtained
by Galí and Rabanal (in press). The price contract duration is also consistent with the
microeconomic studies such as Bils and Klenow (2004). Our estimates suggest that
dynamic indexation is not important for price setting but very important for nominal
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Our posterior estimates of the policy parameters suggest that interest-rate smoothing
is important, with a posterior mode for ½r being 0:73. The response to deviations of
inﬂation from its target in the interest rule is 1:186, but it does not respond much to
detrended output. Finally, the inﬂation target is estimated at 1:98% per annum.
Our posterior estimates of shock variances reported in Table 4 reveal that all but
the preference shock are very persistent, with the AR(1) coeﬃcient at 0:9 or above.
The preference shock is almost i.i.d.. The MA(1) coeﬃcients in the price markup and
wage markup processes are both sizable, at 0:676 and 0:645 respectively. In addition,
the government spending shock responds to the neutral technology shock, with the
response coeﬃcient being 1:446. Although we assume the same prior distribution for
all the shock volatility parameters, we obtain very disperse posterior estimates for
diﬀerent types of shock variances. The estimates reveal that the depreciation shock
and the wage markup shock have the largest variances, the monetary policy shock and
the two types of technology shocks have the smallest variances, and the price markup
shock, the preference shock, and the government spending shock lie somewhere in
between.
VII.2. The variances-changing model. We now discuss the posterior estimates in
the model with regime changes in shock variances, as reported in the sixth column
(under “DSGE-2v”) of Table 3.
Introducing regime shifts in shock variances does not signiﬁcantly change the esti-
mates of most structural parameters. It is worth noting a few diﬀerences compared
to the estimates in the model with the constant regime. The estimated average dura-
tion of the price contracts becomes even shorter (1:7 quarters vs. 2:2 quarters); the
average depreciation rate is slightly higher (13% vs. 11%); the interest-rate-smoothing
parameter ½r is slightly larger (0:82 vs. 0:73); the response coeﬃcient to inﬂation in
the interest rate rule is considerably larger (1:66 vs. 1:19); and the inﬂation target is
slightly higher (2:28 vs. 1:98).
The lack of price rigidity in our estimation is due to a strong strategic complemen-
tarity implied by our best-ﬁt model. There is a tension between the demand elasticity
and the returns to scale: with constant returns (¹ ® = 0), the demand elasticity drops
out of the log-linearized pricing equation so that ﬁrms are not concerned about the
size of the demand elasticity when they set prices; with decreasing returns (¹ ® > 0),
however, the optimal price adjustment is smaller if the demand elasticity is larger.
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demand elasticity (the estimated value of ºp is 1.0001) implies a strong strategic com-
plementarity such that ﬁrms are deterred from adjusting their relative prices when the
demand curve is ﬂat. Indeed, the estimated coeﬃcient of the marginal cost in (31) is
0:076. This value implies that the value of the price rigidity parameter (»p) would be
= 0:76 if there were constant returns.
Regime changes in shock variances inﬂuence the estimation of shock processes, as
shown in Table 4. Compared to the constant-parameter model (DSGE-con), the es-
timated AR(1) coeﬃcient for the price markup shock becomes smaller (0:9491 vs.
0:9998); the estimated MA(1) coeﬃcients in both price and wage markup shock pro-
cesses are larger (0:699 and 0:750 vs. 0:676 and 0:645); the response of government
spending to the neutral technology shock becomes smaller (0:894 vs. 1:446); and the
AR(1) coeﬃcient for the depreciation shock is slightly larger (0:934 vs. 0:899).
The estimates of shock variances are quite diﬀerent from those for the constant-
parameter model. The shock variances in the second regime are substantially smaller
than those in the ﬁrst regime. The sizes of shock variances for the constant-parameter
model are somewhere between those in the ﬁrst regime and those in the second regime.








where the elements in each column sum to one. The second regime (i.e., the regime
with low shock variances) is more persistent and, as shown in Figure 1, covers most
periods after Greenspan became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.
VII.3. Estimates based on a local posterior peak. Because the likelihood is very
non-Gaussian, there exist many local peaks of the posterior density function even for the
constant-parameter model. The last column (under “DSGE-con-lp”) of Tables 3 and 4
report a set of estimates of the structural parameters obtained at a local posterior peak
for the constant-parameter model. This situation is likely to occur in the estimation
of any DSGE model.
Compared to the mode estimates (in the DSGE-con column of Tables 3 and 4), the
values of both price and wage stickiness parameters are higher; the habit parameter is
smaller; the durations for the price and wage contracts are slightly longer; the wage
indexation parameter is much smaller; the monetary policy response to inﬂation is
modestly larger and the response to output is much larger. The trend growth rate for
investment technology is 2.3% per annum. Furthermore, the estimated price and wageSOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 27
markup processes are less persistent and the indexation becomes less important than
those implied by the estimates obtained at the posterior mode; the preference shock
becomes much more persistent. The variances of the shocks are broadly similar to the
mode estimates.
At this local peak, we get two distinct inﬂation targets: one is at 2:8% and the other
is at 5:2%. These estimates, as well as the other estimates, seem to be all reasonable
and in line with our a priori beliefs. But the posterior value is much smaller than the
value at the posterior mode on the order of 100 in log value, implying an extremely
poor ﬁt to the data. As we will show in Section VIII.2, the variance decompositions
under the estimates at the lower posterior peak are drastically diﬀerent from those at
the posterior mode.
VIII. Model Analysis
VIII.1. Impulse responses. To gain intuition about the model’s transmission mech-
anisms, we analyze impulse responses of selected variables following some of the struc-
tural shocks. In particular, we focus on the dynamic eﬀects of a wage markup shock,
a neutral technology shock, and a depreciation shock on output, investment, the real
wage, the inﬂation rate, hours, and the nominal interest rate. As we have discussed
in Section VII, the wage markup shock and the depreciation shock have the largest
variances among all eight structural shocks. The neutral technology shock is of consid-
erable interest because of the debate in the recent literature on its dynamic eﬀects on
the labor market variables (e.g., Galí (1999), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson
(2003), Uhlig (2004), and Liu and Phaneuf (2007)). The macroeconomic eﬀects of the
other ﬁve shocks, including the monetary policy shock, the price markup shock, the
biased technology shock, the preference shock, and the government spending shock are
similar to those in the literature (Smets and Wouters, 2007), so we do not report those
results. Since the impulse responses display qualitatively similar patterns across the
two shock regimes except the scaling eﬀects, we focus on the responses in the second
regime.
Figure 2 displays the impulse responses following a one-standard-deviation shock
to the capital depreciation rate. The increase in the depreciation rate reduces the
value of capital accumulation and thus investment falls. Since the expected stock of
capital wealth declines, the negative wealth eﬀect leads to a fall in consumption as
well. Consequently, aggregate output falls. The decline in output leads to a decline in
hours. The decline in hours and in consumption lowers the marginal rate of substitutionSOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 28
between leisure and consumption, so that the households’ desired wage falls. Thus, the
equilibrium real wage declines as well. The fall in the real wage reduces the ﬁrms’
marginal cost so that inﬂation declines. Through the Taylor rule, the nominal interest
rate declines as well.
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses following a one-standard-deviation shock
to the investment-speciﬁc technology. The biased shock raises the eﬃciency of invest-
ment, investment goods today become cheaper and current consumption becomes more
expensive. This type of shock, unlike the depreciation shock or the neutral technology
shock, shifts resources from consumption to investment. Consequently, investment rises
and consumption declines for more than eight quarters. Hours declines initially due to
the costly adjustment in investment, as well as the habit formation. After the second
quarter, the increase in demand for investment gradually leads to a rise in hours and
the real wage. The rise in labor hours helps produce more output. In contrast to the
responses to the depreciation shock, the biased technology shock generates opposite
movements in output and consumption in the short run.
Figure 4 displays the impulse responses following a one-standard-deviation shock
to the neutral technology. The positive neutral technology shock raises output, con-
sumption, investment, and the real wage. The shock lowers inﬂation and, through
the Taylor rule, the nominal interest rate as well. The shock also leads to a decline
in hours worked. The decline in hours here, however, is not a direct consequence of
price stickiness. Even with much more frequent price adjustments, we ﬁnd that the
positive neutral technology shock leads to a decline in hours (not reported). Instead,
the investment adjustment cost (as well as the habit formation to a less extent) plays
an important role in generating the decline in hours. If the investment adjustment cost
parameter is small, we ﬁnd that the model generates an increase in hours following the
neutral technology shock (not reported), regardless of whether prices are sticky or not.
In this sense, our ﬁnding does not support the view that the contractionary eﬀect of
a neutral technology shock arises from the price stickiness. Our ﬁnding is consistent
with Francis and Ramey (2005), who argue that a real business cycle model with habit
persistence and investment adjustment cost can generate a decline in hours following
a positive neutral technology shock.
Figure 5 displays the impulse responses following a one-standard-deviation shock to
the wage markup. An increase in the wage markup raises the households’ desired real
wage. The households who can adjust their nominal wage raise their nominal wage.
The increase in the nominal wage raises the ﬁrms’ marginal cost so that inﬂation risesSOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 29
and real aggregate demand falls. It follows that aggregate output, investment, and
hours decline. Through the interest-rate rule, the rise in inﬂation also leads to an
increase in the nominal interest rate.
VIII.2. Variance decompositions.
VIII.2.1. The lower peak case. We ﬁrst examine the variance decomposition results
based on the parameter estimates obtained under the constant regime and at the lower
posterior peak. The parameter values are reported in the last column of Tables 3 and 4.
As we have discussed in Section VII, the parameter estimates at this lower posterior
peak all seem reasonable. Yet, the variance decompositions reported in Table 7 indicate
that most of the ﬂuctuations in output are attributed to the neutral technology shock
and those in inﬂation to the preference shock and the biased technology shock. In
contrast to the variance decompositions reported in Tables 5 and 6, the estimated
model at the lower posterior peak mistakenly suggests that the wage markup shock
and the depreciation shock do not play much role in generating the ﬂuctuations. These
results suggest caution in searching for the posterior mode in Bayesian estimation.
VIII.2.2. The best-ﬁt model. Tables 5 and 6 report variance decompositions in fore-
cast errors of output, investment, hours, the real wage, and inﬂation under the two
shock regimes at diﬀerent forecasting horizons for our best-ﬁt model. Consistent with
our estimation results discussed in Section VII, capital depreciation shocks, neutral
technology shocks, and wage markup shocks play an important role in accounting for
business cycle ﬂuctuations under each of the two regimes. Taken together, these three
shocks account for about 70 ¡ 90% of the ﬂuctuations in output, investment, hours,
and inﬂation under each regime for the forecast horizons beyond eight quarters.
The wage markup shock acts as a wedge between the intratemporal marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) and the marginal product of labor, which, as argued by Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), plays an important role in generating the business cycle.
The neutral technology shock is also important in accounting for the ﬂuctuations
in output and the real wage under both regimes, consistent with the ﬁnding in Arias,
Hansen, and Ohanian (2006). Monetary policy shock accounts for a sizable fraction of
inﬂation ﬂuctuations under the ﬁrst regime but otherwise it is unimportant. The price
markup shock contributes to about 15¡30% of the real wage ﬂuctuations under both
regimes. It also plays an important role for inﬂation ﬂuctuations under the second
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preference shock, and the biased technology shock are not important in explaining the
business-cycle ﬂuctuations.
The depreciation shock, on the other hand, acts as a wedge in the intertemporal
capital accumulation decision. Since we use observations on the biased technological
changes in our estimation, estimated biased technology shocks are much smaller in size
than those when these observations are not used. Like the biased technology shock
emphasized in Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2008), the depreciation shock
ﬁlls the gap by capturing the intertemporal wedge, which is important in generating
the business cycle. Unlike the biased technology shock, however, it generates the
comovements of consumption and output, as discussed in the pervious section.
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) draw a mapping between the growth
rate of investment-speciﬁc technological changes and the economic depreciation rate.
Since the economic depreciation rate rises when the equipment price relative to the
consumption price is expected to decline in the future, which leads to faster economic
depreciation than physical depreciation, (unexpected) shocks to investment-speciﬁc
technological changes play a less important role. Unlike economic depreciation, positive
shocks to the depreciation of physical capital represent contractions in all real economic
activities; these shocks are found important in our estimated model.
VIII.3. Parameter uncertainty. Figure 6 plots the posterior distribution of some
key parameters. The distribution of the inﬂation target concentrate tightly around the
estimate of 2%, while there is considerable uncertainty around the wage indexation
parameter. The posterior distribution of the price-stickiness parameter implies that
the price rigidity is much smaller than what is obtained in the previous literature. The
wage rigidity is even less important, with little probability above 0.5. The posterior
distribution of the investment technology trend puts a signiﬁcant amount of probability
around 4%, consistent with the data on the relative price of investment. The posterior
distribution of the response coeﬃcient to inﬂation in the Taylor indicate that there is
practically no probability for indeterminate equilibria for our DSGE model.
There are two reasons why we obtain estimates that imply shorter durations of price
and wage contracts than those obtained in the literature such as Altig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004) and Smets and Wouters (2007). First, our estimates
suggest that the price markup is very small, implying that the demand curve for dif-
ferentiated goods is very ﬂat. Thus, a small increase in the relative price can lead to
large declines in relative output demand. Even if ﬁrms can re-optimize their pricing
decisions very frequently, they choose not to adjust their relative prices too much. InSOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 31
this sense, the small average markup and thus the large demand elasticity become a
source of strategic complementarity in ﬁrms’ pricing decisions. Second, unlike Altig,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004) who use a minimum-distance estimator that
matches the model’s impulse responses to those in the data, we use full-information
maximum likelihood estimation. This diﬀerence is important because Altig, Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2004) ﬁnd that, while a neutral technology shock leads
to rapid adjustment in prices, a monetary policy shock leads to small and gradual
price adjustments. Under their estimation approach, matching the impulse responses
following the monetary policy shock is important so that price adjustments need to be
small and gradual. Our estimation approach diﬀers from theirs and we ﬁnd that the
most important shocks are neutral technology shocks, capital depreciation shocks, and
wage markup shocks, all of which lead to rapid adjustments in prices. Consequently,
our estimated durations of nominal contracts are shorter than those in the literature.
IX. Conclusion
We have studied a variety of fairly large DSGE models within a uniﬁed framework to
reexamine the sources of the Great Moderation observed in the post-WWII U.S. econ-
omy. Our econometric estimation suggests that heteroscedastic shock disturbances are
important and diﬀerent types of shock variances tend to change regime simultaneously
rather than independently. Three shocks stand out as the most important sources of
macroeconomic volatilities: the wage markup shock that serves as an intratemporal
labor supply wedge, the neutral technology shock that acts as an eﬃciency wedge, and
the depreciation shock that acts like an intertemporal wedge. Our best-ﬁt model does
not provide evidence of systematic changes in the inﬂation target, nor does it support
strong nominal rigidities in prices and nominal wages. These ﬁndings are robust across
a large set of models.
Appendix A. Detailed Data Description
All data are either taken directly from the Haver Analytics Database or constructed
by Patrick Higgins at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. The construction methods
developed or used by Patrick Higgins, available on request, will be brieﬂy described
below.
The model estimation is based on eight U.S. aggregate variables: real per capita
GDP (Y Data
t ), real per capita consumption (CData
t ), real per capita investment (IData
t )
in capital goods, real wage (wData
t ), the quarterly GDP-deﬂator inﬂation rate (¼Data
t ),SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 32
per capita hours (LData
t ), the federal funds rate (FFR
Data
t ), and the inverse of the
relative price of investment (QData
t ).
These series are derived from the original data in the Haver Analytics Database





























The original data, the constructed data, and their sources are described as follows.
POP25-64: civilian noninstitutional population with ages 25-64 by eliminating
breaks in population from 10-year censuses and post 2000 American Community
Surveys using “error of closure” method. This fairly simple method was used by
the Census Bureau to get a smooth population monthly population series. This
smooth series reduces the unusual inﬂuence of drastic demographic changes.
GDPH: real gross domestic product (2000 dollars). Source: BEA.
CN@USECON: nominal personal consumption expenditures: nondurable goods.
Source: BEA
CS@USECON: nominal consumption expenditures: services. Source: BEA.
CD@USECON: nominal personal consumption expenditures: durable goods.
Source: BEA.
F@USECON: nominal private ﬁxed investment. Source: BEA.
JGDP: gross domestic product: chain price index (2000=100). Source: BEA.
LXNFC@USECON: nonfarm business sector: compensation per hour (1992=100).
Source: BLS.
LXNFH@USECON: nonfarm business sector: hours of all persons (1992=100).
Source: BLS.
FFED@USECON: annualized federal funds eﬀective rate. Source: FRB.
TornPriceInv4707CV: investment deﬂator. The Tornquist procedure is used
to construct this deﬂator as a weighted aggregate index from the four quality-
adjusted price indexes: private nonresidential structures investment, private
residential investment, private nonresidential equipment & software investment,SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 33
and personal consumption expenditures on durable goods. Each price index is a
weighted one from a number of individual price series within this categories. For
each individual price series from 1947 to 1983, we use Gordon (1990)’s quality-
adjusted price index. Following Cummins and Violante (2002), we estimate an
econometric model of Gordon’s price series as a function of a time trend and a
few NIPA indicators (including the current and lagged values of the correspond-
ing NIPA price series); the estimated coeﬃcients are then used to extrapolate
the quality-adjusted price index for each individual price series for the sample
from 1984 to 2007. These constructed price series are annual. Denton (1971)’s
method is used to interpolate these annual series on a quarterly frequency. The
Tornquist procedure is then used to construct each quality-adjusted price index
from the appropriate interpolated quarterly price series.
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Note: Column 1 lists the models studied: the DSGE model with all parameters that
are constant across time (DSGE-con), the DSGE model with two regimes in shock
variances (DSGE-2v), the DSGE model with two regimes in the inﬂation target only
(DSGE-2c), the DSGE model with two common regimes for both shock variances and
the inﬂation target (DSGE-2cv), and the DSGE model with two independent Markov
processes, one controlling two regimes in shock variances and the other controlling
two regimes in the inﬂation target (DSGE-2c2v), the DSGE model with two
independent Markov processes, one controlling two regimes in variances of two
technology shocks and the other controlling two regimes in variances of all the other
shocks (DSGE-2v2v), and the DSGE model with three regimes in shock variances
(DSGE-3v). Column 2 reports the posterior densities at the posterior mode, adjusted
by Schwarz criterion. Column 3 displays the posterior densities evaluated at the
posterior modes for models with the persistence parameters in both the price and
wage markup processes set to zero.
Table 2. Comprehensive Measures of Model Fits
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Table 3. Prior Distribution and Posterior Mode of Structural Parameters
Prior Posterior
Parameter Distribution Low High DSGE-con DSGE-2v DSGE-con-lp
b Beta 0:05 0:948 0:876 0:907 0:579
´ Gamma 0:2 10:0 2:235 2:888 1:689
100(¯¡1 ¡ 1) Beta 0:2 4:0 0:109 0:175 0:336
®1 Beta 0:15 0:35 0:153 0:163 0:122
®2 Beta 0:35 0:75 0:837 0:835 0:528
100(¸q ¡ 1) Gamma 0:1 1:5 0:999 1:000 0:559
100(¸¤ ¡ 1) Gamma 0:1 1:5 0:179 0:237 0:372
¾u Gamma 0:5 3:0 2:266 2:263 1:417
S00 Gamma 0:5 5:0 1:525 2:000 2:031
4± Beta 0:05 0:2 0:107 0:134 0:164
¹p ¡ 1 Gamma 0:01 0:50 0:002 0:000 0:065
¹w ¡ 1 Gamma 0:01 0:50 0:069 0:060 0:096
»p Beta 0:1 0:75 0:545 0:412 0:592
°p Beta 0:05 0:95 0:118 0:178 0:204
»w Beta 0:1 0:75 0:185 0:213 0:345
°w Beta 0:05 0:95 1:000 1:000 0:263
½r Beta 0:05 0:948 0:730 0:816 0:801
Á¼ Gamma 0:5 5:0 1:185 1:655 2:081
Áy Gamma 0:05 3:0 0:005 0:043 0:474
400log¼¤(1) Gamma 1:0 8:0 1:981 2:283 3:219
400log¼¤(2) Gamma 1:0 8:0 1:981 2:283 3:219
Note: “Low” and “High” denote the bounds of the 5%-95% probability interval for the
prior distributions. “DSGE-con” denotes the model with no regime switching.
“DSGE-2v” denotes the model with two regimes in shock variances. “DSGE-con-lp”
denotes the model with no regime switching and with a lower posterior peak.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 40
Table 4. Prior Distribution and Posterior Mode of Shock Parameters
Prior Posterior
Parameter Distribution Low High DSGE-con DSGE-2v DSGE-con-lp
½p Beta 0:05 0:948 0:999 0:949 0:778
Áp Beta 0:05 0:948 0:675 0:698 0:483
½w Beta 0:05 0:948 0:999 0:999 0:840
Áw Beta 0:05 0:948 0:645 0:749 0:513
½gz Gamma 0:2 3:0 1:446 0:894 0:664
½a Beta 0:05 0:948 0:061 0:107 0:881
½q Beta 0:05 0:95 0:993 0:994 1:000
½z Beta 0:05 0:95 0:997 0:992 0:999
½d Beta 0:05 0:948 0:899 0:934 0:823
¾r(1) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:002 0:004 0:002
¾r(2) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:002 0:001 0:002
¾p(1) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:024 0:039 0:060
¾p(2) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:024 0:028 0:060
¾w(1) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:105 0:255 0:118
¾w(2) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:105 0:144 0:118
¾g(1) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:026 0:041 0:025
¾g(2) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:026 0:021 0:025
¾z(1) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:007 0:010 0:012
¾z(2) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:007 0:006 0:012
¾a(1) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:027 0:043 0:018
¾a(2) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:027 0:037 0:018
¾q(1) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:004 0:007 0:004
¾q(2) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:004 0:002 0:004
¾d(1) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:138 0:193 0:287
¾d(2) Inverse Gamma 0:0005 1:0 0:138 0:099 0:287
q11 Dirichlet * 0:807 *
q22 Dirichlet * 0:940 *SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 41
Table 5. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: Regime I
Horizon MP PM WM GS Ntech Pref Btech Dep
Output
4Q 5.1443 4.1486 21.7621 12.8076 21.7050 1.4694 0.2106 32.7525
8Q 2.6618 4.1472 36.6626 6.3157 23.4311 0.5821 0.3289 25.8707
16Q 1.2227 2.9278 49.3857 3.4905 25.7249 0.2658 0.3942 16.5885
20Q 0.9756 2.5166 52.4044 2.9881 26.1211 0.2121 0.4119 14.3702
Investment
4Q 8.2082 5.7979 14.4682 0.7438 4.7909 0.5182 1.5667 63.9061
8Q 4.6292 6.2905 22.8817 1.1375 7.1533 0.7034 2.2140 54.9904
16Q 3.2021 5.9545 30.5410 1.2310 10.2411 0.6839 3.6330 44.5134
20Q 3.0318 5.7789 32.0371 1.1764 11.1034 0.6478 4.2787 41.9460
Hours
4Q 6.2409 4.6560 33.5268 18.7046 3.9659 2.0046 0.0815 30.8198
8Q 3.4031 4.8188 58.8519 10.9127 1.8040 0.9368 0.1388 19.1339
16Q 1.7212 3.0812 76.6957 6.8522 0.9926 0.4698 0.1114 10.0761
20Q 1.3929 2.5430 79.8568 6.0511 0.8162 0.3841 0.0938 8.8619
Real wage
4Q 6.2726 14.9794 24.5772 0.2213 34.1127 1.1717 0.2982 18.3668
8Q 5.6839 19.8200 12.8581 0.1161 31.7275 0.5643 0.2978 28.9321
16Q 3.3235 20.6873 6.9996 0.1603 36.8344 0.3290 0.3967 31.2691
20Q 2.8272 19.7771 5.9603 0.1726 39.2705 0.2857 0.4580 31.2486
Inﬂation
4Q 17.1586 11.2160 34.3253 1.1835 0.1755 1.1923 0.5994 34.1493
8Q 17.1334 9.3782 36.9222 1.1124 0.1509 1.0689 0.7772 33.4568
16Q 14.3407 7.9953 40.9412 0.9402 0.1589 0.9094 0.7557 33.9585
20Q 12.8011 7.2902 42.2714 0.8484 0.2053 0.8251 0.6802 35.0783
Note: Columns 2 ¡ 9 correspond to the shocks: the monetary policy shock (MP), the
price markup shock (PM), the wage markup shock (WM), the government spending
shock (GS), the neutral technology shock (Ntech), the preference shock (Pref), the
biased technology shock (Btech), and the depreciation shock (Dep).SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 42
Table 6. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: Regime II
Horizon MP PM WM GS Ntech Pref Btech Dep
Output
4Q 1.4623 6.8572 22.2957 10.9572 27.1732 3.5101 0.0921 27.6522
8Q 0.7325 6.6368 36.3663 5.2312 28.4007 1.3462 0.1392 21.1470
16Q 0.3285 4.5746 47.8282 2.8228 30.4437 0.6002 0.1629 13.2390
20Q 0.2611 3.9167 50.5532 2.4070 30.7917 0.4770 0.1696 11.4238
Investment
4Q 2.6142 10.7376 16.6082 0.7130 6.7202 1.3870 0.7675 60.4524
8Q 1.3975 11.0425 24.8966 1.0335 9.5109 1.7845 1.0280 49.3065
16Q 0.9411 10.1760 32.3509 1.0888 13.2559 1.6891 1.6423 38.8559
20Q 0.8887 9.8499 33.8462 1.0379 14.3342 1.5957 1.9291 36.5185
Hours
4Q 1.8550 8.0476 35.9182 16.7333 5.1919 5.0074 0.0373 27.2093
8Q 0.9744 8.0232 60.7354 9.4043 2.2750 2.2543 0.0611 16.2724
16Q 0.4847 5.0454 77.8436 5.8075 1.2310 1.1118 0.0482 8.4277
20Q 0.3918 4.1596 80.9619 5.1229 1.0112 0.9081 0.0406 7.4039
Real wage
4Q 1.5771 21.9006 22.2722 0.1675 37.7754 2.4758 0.1153 13.7161
8Q 1.4263 28.9214 11.6296 0.0877 35.0659 1.1900 0.1150 21.5641
16Q 0.8150 29.4979 6.1863 0.1183 39.7808 0.6781 0.1496 22.7740
20Q 0.6917 28.1379 5.2561 0.1271 42.3184 0.5875 0.1724 22.7089
Inﬂation
4Q 5.3155 20.2044 38.3260 1.1035 0.2395 3.1041 0.2856 31.4214
8Q 5.3827 17.1324 41.8078 1.0518 0.2089 2.8220 0.3755 31.2189
16Q 4.4593 14.4569 45.8850 0.8799 0.2176 2.3764 0.3614 31.3634
20Q 3.9610 13.1172 47.1437 0.7901 0.2798 2.1456 0.3237 32.2388SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 43
Table 7. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: the model with no
regime switching and with lower posterior peak
Horizon MP PM WM GS Ntech Pref Btech Dep
Output
4Q 0.0007 0.0625 0.0000 0.0000 97.3630 1.6410 0.8873 0.0455
8Q 0.0003 0.0427 0.0000 0.0000 97.9274 0.7430 1.2537 0.0328
12Q 0.0002 0.0284 0.0000 0.0000 97.9745 0.5449 1.4282 0.0238
16Q 0.0001 0.0209 0.0000 0.0000 97.9928 0.4304 1.5376 0.0182
20Q 0.0001 0.0165 0.0000 0.0000 98.0053 0.3506 1.6130 0.0145
Inﬂation
4Q 0.0063 7.8444 0.0001 0.0001 0.1409 77.0744 14.5833 0.3504
8Q 0.0049 5.7245 0.0001 0.0002 0.4070 77.5122 15.5821 0.7691
12Q 0.0042 4.9742 0.0001 0.0002 2.0464 76.9793 14.9383 1.0573
16Q 0.0039 4.5371 0.0001 0.0003 4.4264 75.8520 14.0143 1.1659
20Q 0.0036 4.2595 0.0001 0.0003 6.9458 74.3397 13.2695 1.1816SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 44






























Figure 1. Posterior probabilities of the second regime for the baseline
DSGE-2v.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 45
































































































































Figure 2. Impulse responses to a depreciation shock in the second regime.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 46

































































































































Figure 3. Impulse responses to an investment-speciﬁc technology shock
in the second regime.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 47































































































































Figure 4. Impulse responses to a neutral technology shock in the second regime.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 48





























































































































Figure 5. Impulse responses to a wage markup shock in the second regime.SOURCES OF THE GREAT MODERATION 49
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Figure 6. Marginal posterior distributions of some key parameters for
the DSGE-2v model.
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